Economics and Politics of Official Loans versus Grants Panoramic Issues and Empirical Evidence by Odedokun, Matthew
Copyright  UNU/WIDER 2003
* UNU/WIDER (World Institute for Development Economics Research); email: odedokun@wider.unu.edu
This study has been prepared within the UNU/WIDER project on the Sustainability of External
Development Financing, which is directed by Matthew Odedokun.
This paper was presented at the project meeting in Helsinki, 23-24 August 2002.
UNU/WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution to the project by the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of Finland.
Discussion Paper No. 2003/04
Economics and Politics of Official
Loans versus Grants




The paper examines a wide range of issues relating to the mix between loans and grants as well as
the degree of concessionality of loans. A number of empirical tests are carried out based on annual
panel data over 1970 to 1999 for 22 donor countries and 72 recipient countries. Based on the tests,
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past decisions on the grant-loan mix. We also observe that for bilateral donors, past grant-loan mix
(and, hence, reflows from past transfers) do not influence the volume of current resource transfers.
In addition, we find that loans are better suited than grants in promoting recipient governments
budgetary discipline, as is commonly understood in fiscal reform literature. Our tests also show
that the rate of official borrowing by the recipients (and, by deduction, the extent of their past debt
burden) is positively influenced by the extent of the concessionality of such loans—irrespective of
whether it is in the form of subsidized interest rates or longer grace periods. The paper concludes
with a review of the circumstances in which grants, soft loans and non-concessional loans might
have their respective comparative advantage, as well as a discussion of the need, so as to
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component and the option to take from the non-concessional loan component as much as desired.
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1 Introduction
Development assistance has traditionally been provided in the form of a mix of grants
and (usually concessional) loans, with the mix varying among donors. However,
development assistance in the form of grants only began to gain prominence from
March 2000 as a result of the publication of Meltzer’s Report—a controversial right-
wing oriented report prepared for the US Congress by its International Financial
Institution Advisory Committee (IFIAC), under the chairmanship of Professor Allan
Meltzer. One major recommendation of the committee is that the support of the
multilateral development banks should not only be re-focused in scope, but should
henceforth be provided almost exclusively in the form of grants.1 According to the
IFIAC report (2000: Executive Summary):
For the globe’s truly poor, the provision of improved levels of health
care, primary education and physical infrastructure, once the original
focus for development funding, should again become the starting point
for raising living standards. Outright grants rather than loans provide a
realistic vehicle for poverty alleviation.
The report also recommends grants at the bilateral level, urging rhetorically that:
More generally, the United States should be prepared to increase
significantly its budgetary support for the poorest countries if they pursue
effective programs of economic development. This support should come
in several forms: debt reduction, grants channelled through the
multilateral development agencies, and bilateral grant aid.
However, the left-wing  oriented pre-2001 administration of the United States was
opposed to the suggestion. Specifically, the US Treasury Department contended in 2000
that this would limit the overall availability of financial resources to the poorest
countries and eliminate the reflows arising from the repayment of concessional loans,
especially as it would be difficult to obtain legislative approval in the respective donor
countries for the increased replenishment necessary to compensate for the loss of
reflows. It also argued that the reality of eventual repayment provides an added
incentive for judicious, selective and wise utilization of the proceeds by the recipients—
in other words, outright grants appear more prone to being squandered.2
                                                
1 The report also recommends, ‘Lending for institutional reform in poor countries without capital
market access…’ (IFIAC: Executive Summary).
2 These two left-wing arguments had also been adduced in the ‘dissenting statement’, issued as the
minority report by some IFIAC members. They have also been the centre of the points being
subsequently raised by donors and concerned international NGOs on the other side of the Atlantic.
The IFIAC main report, too, explicitly recognizes these two concerns, especially on the part of
multilateral development banks, and agrees on the existence of one of the two, for it states
(IFIAC: Chapter 3) that:
The development establishment resists grant-funding on two counts. First, they claim, the
borrower would have no obligation to repay, leading to a lack of discipline … Second, for
multilateral development banks, grant-funding is a less certain source of funds than current
arrangements that are based to a much greater extent on permanent capital commitments. As
the share of grants rises, the development agencies would have to ask the legislatures of the
donor countries for increased support. The risk exists that legislatures would reduce funding.2
While this all-grant recommendation was rejected by the US administration in 2000, the
successor right-wing oriented administration that came to power in early 2001 came out
strongly in support of an all-grant bilateral aid as well as a predominantly grant-based
multilateral support through the multilateral development banks under US influence,
including the World Bank (WB). The post-2000 administration has adduced a number
of arguments for pressing relentlessly for the immediate replacement by grants (up to 50
per cent) of concessional loans of the WB’s most concessional lending window—
International Development Association, IDA.3 In addition to resuscitating the earlier
pro-grant arguments of IFIAC, one of the reasons adduced is that loans would saddle
recipients with the burden of eventual repayment. Another reason addressed is that
grants are the most appropriate for financing most of the projects (e.g., health, education
and social services) that are pressing to the recipients who, as a pre-qualification, are
very poor. However, this post-2000 US position did not find favour on the other side of
the Atlantic with other financiers of the IDA. Opposition, led by the UK, has been
repeating and even expanding the arguments put forward earlier by the pre-2001 US
administration. Various economic and political issues related to the proposal that IDA
shift to grant-giving are further discussed in Sanford (2002).
But the issue of loans versus pure grants transcends the IDA institution. First, IDA is
not the only concessional lending window of a multilateral financial institution—similar
soft windows exist with the regional development banks, just as it does at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of the fund for Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF). Whatever pro- and anti-grant arguments exist for IDA should
largely apply to all these as well. Second, the regular or relatively non-concessional
lending of the multilateral development banks—for example, the World Bank’s
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)—is also concessional
to a degree (see IFIAC 2000: Chapter 2). Third, bilateral official assistance too often
(albeit with a decreasing relative importance recently) takes the form of soft loans and
the case for and against all-grant assistance from multilateral sources should largely
apply here also.
In addition, the loan versus pure grant issue also applies to the distinction between soft
or concessional loans versus non-concessional loans. A concessional loan (which is the
one that is currently in vogue) is a subsidized credit and, by definition, has a grant
element built into it and can therefore be conceptualized as a grant when it is being
                                                                                                                                              
Another argument that has been adduced by the critics of grant-funding is the so-called ‘mission
creep’, whereby IDA and regional equivalents would end up competing, possibly unfairly, with
various smaller and inherently grant-giving-based UN agencies (see Salazar 2002). Some critics also
want to see IDA become in the near future financially insulated and independent from donors and
their politics, and they see the reflows being generated in the future through current lending as a way
of achieving this (see Salazar 2002). Further analysis of all-grant IDA resource transfers is discussed
by Sanford (2002).
3 Established in 1961, the IDA is the most concessional lending window of the World Bank Group.
Except for the 0.75 per cent service charge, an IDA loan is interest-free, grace period is 10 years, and
it is to be repaid within 40 years. The grant element is thus estimated to be almost 70 per cent. It lends
to countries with a per capita income of less than US$ 885 at 2000 value and without the financial
capability to borrow from the World Bank regular loan window. The fund is being partly (about
40 per cent) financed from reflows from past lending and partly from contributions from developed
country donors, who appoint IDA deputies. Every three years, these deputies negotiate fresh
contributions and a two-thirds vote is needed before reaching replenishment decisions—the latest of
which is the ongoing 2002 IDA-13.3
compared with a non-concessional loan. Thus, a discussion of pure grants versus loans
should not be divorced from the related issue of concessional versus non-concessional
loans.
Following from the above and based mainly on the debates that have arisen on the
argument of loans versus grants since the beginning of twenty-first century consequent
to the release of the IFIAC report and the post-2000 position of the US administration,
the paper addresses a number of issues below:
i)  Political economy of aid giving: whether the provision of loans is likely to be
easier for donor governments to justify before their parliaments and taxpayers
than implied grants, as contended by left-wing advocates.
ii)  Implication for sustainability of aid volume: whether donors, by switching
from subsidized loans to outright grants, would continue to give the same
volume in the form of pure grants as the concessional loans they have been
giving in the past so as not to reduce the volume of external finance available
to many recipient countries who do not have access to international capital
markets.
iii)  Efficiency and financial discipline on the part of recipients: whether, in the
same manner that a subsidized resource tends to reduce its efficiency of
utilization at the margin, financial discipline on the part of recipients is
encouraged by loans than outright grants in their programme/project selection
and implementation, as suggested by economic theory and argued by the left-
wing.
iv)  Implications for future debt burden: whether, in the same manner that
subsidization of commodities encourages their increased consumption or
usage, there is a tendency to over-borrow on the part of recipients when a loan
is subsidized (as predicted by economic theory) and, hence, whether softness
of such loans could partly explain the official accumulation of debt over time,
especially by poor countries. This is to test prediction of the theory and it has
no ideological connotation, as such.
v)  Identification of cases where pure grants, soft loans and non-concessional
loans are supposed to have their respective comparative advantages, especially
in achieving donor objectives.
vi)  Given the inefficiency of both pure grants and subsidized credits in general
cases, a reconciliation of grant and loan-giving through an appropriate
unbundling of a soft loan whereby, instead of the subsidized loan, there is a
split of the amount into the implied pure grant (for pro-poor spending) and free
access to an appropriate volume of non-concessional credit facility.
Given the past lack of interest in the literature concerning grant versus non-grant forms
of resource transfers (with the exception of the largely political analysis of the subject
recently by Sanford 2002), the extensiveness of issues covered in the present paper, as
listed above, is warranted and there is no apology for this. It is, however, hoped that
each of the various aspects would be the subject of more detailed and specialized
research endeavours by future researchers.4
The rest of the paper is organized into six sections. The first two (relating to donors) of
the above six issues are taken up sequentially in sections 2 and 3; the next two issues
(on the recipients side) are addressed in sections 4 and 5, and the last two in sections
6 and 7. To the extent possible, attempts are made to shed light on most of the issues
with empirical tests, based on multi-country data for donors and recipients. Finally, in
section 8, we present the summary and conclusion.
2 Donors’ possible motivation in choosing between grants and loans
The choice and mix between grants and loans on the part of donors have hardly been an
issue until recently. As a result, there have been virtually no previous theoretical or
empirical studies on the subject to fall back on. What is done below is to explore the
directions that future theories can take and to provide an exploratory ‘pragmatic’
pioneering empirical evidence on the factors that have shaped the grant-loan mix of the
aid given by donors in the past.
2.1 Possible theoretical frameworks
At a theoretical level, one is inclined to analyse the bilateral donors’ motivations for
choosing between grants or loans by having recourse to existing theories of gift-giving
versus informal credit schemes that seek to explain the risk-aversion behaviour in
peasant societies. While sovereign state donors and recipients cannot be described as
peasants, the ensuing relationships between these actors share a number of features
common to such peasant theories—for example, imperfect and informal credit markets,
non-profit motives, informal but effective enforcement of reciprocity (including credit
repayment), etc.
One line of thought seeks to explain reciprocity and gift-giving in terms of morality, to
assist the poor (e.g., Scott 1976). Others invoke the related concept of altruism whereby
gift-giving is posited to raise the level of utility of the giver (e.g., Ravallion and
Dearden 1988; Foster and Rosenzweig 1995). Still related to these is the theory of social
exchange (see Heath 1976) that postulates that givers give because of the intangible
counter-exchange or benefits derived, such as respect, status, avoidance of guilt, etc. All
these would support a form of what is termed generalized reciprocity, whereby the
counter-flow or counter-obligation in a tangible form, if it exists, is definite neither in
magnitude nor timing. This would be equivalent to pure grants in a bilateral foreign aid
situation.
On the other hand, there is (following Malinowski 1978) also what is called balanced
reciprocity, which is the one characterized by tangible quid pro quo, sometimes
contemporaneously as in normal exchange transactions and sometimes taking the form
of a gift with a firm understanding of reciprocation of roughly equal value within a
reasonable timespan (e.g., see Platteau 1997 and Fafchamps 1999). A number of
explanations of balanced reciprocity could also apply to pure grants, those characterized
by covert commercial and tangible political and related quid pro quo, for example,
procurement-tied as well as strategic, political and other self-interest motivated types.
But, in the main, such theories would apply to virtually all types of bilateral official
loans, concessional or not.  So, factors influencing donors’ choice between pure grants5
and aid can be found by examining the differences in the explanations put forward in
the theories of generalized and balanced forms of reciprocal exchange. As rightly
observed by Thomas and Worrall (2002: 5), balanced reciprocity in the form of credits
would be inappropriate when the receiving household’s deprivation is likely to persist
for some time with series of adverse shocks in succession, as the recipient would not be
in a position to meet the counter-obligation within the envisaged timespan. But, ‘had it
received a gift without counter-obligation after the first shock, it is in no worse position
when the second shock hits, and provided another gift is made, it will be able to
maintain its consumption’. The authors then provide the rationale why, despite this
flexibility of generalized reciprocal exchange or gift-giving, reciprocal exchange in the
form of credit or quasi-credit arrangements still thrives. According to Thomas and
Worrall (2002: 5):
… we shall argue that quasi-credit components arise quite naturally when
reciprocity is voluntary rather than enforced and is based on rational
action. ... The problem with a pure insurance/gift arrangement, where the
only counter-obligation on the receiver is the general obligation to
respond likewise if the giver is in need in the future, is that this counter-
obligation may not be sufficient to induce the giver to part with resources
today. This can be seen if the giver is confident that he or she will not be
in need of help in the immediate future, so that the general
counter-obligation has little value. On the other hand, if there is a credit
element to the transaction, the giver will expect some future reward—
repayment on the loan—over and above any reciprocal insurance
promise, and this may provide sufficient incentive to induce the giver to
part with resources today.
The above propositions can arguably be applied, with appropriate modifications and
extension, to explain the rationale why bilateral donors should or do give loans, instead
of pure grants. But the rationale applies to only bilateral aid. It can hardly provide an
explanation of the choice between grants and loans by multilateral donors like, say, the
World Bank. For this, a different theoretical framework would be needed. In this
context, using the World Bank as an illustration, a multilateral development bank can be
viewed as an agent while the donor countries are the principals. This means that the
principal-agency theories seeking to describe the common agency problem (interactions
of many principals with one agent) and explaining the behaviour of a national aid
agency serving principals with conflicting interests (e.g., as put forward by Murshed
and Sen 1995), may also be applicable to a multilateral development bank. The typical
concessional loan window of a multilateral development bank (e.g., IDA of the World
Bank) is akin to a national aid agency that is responsible to principals with conflicting
interests. As pointed out earlier, the US and donors from the other side of the Atlantic
have conflicting interests as to whether the World Bank should give out more resources
in the form of grants, which the World Bank dreads as being a way of reducing its size.
Within such a framework, a theory can be developed to explain the choice and mix
between multilateral grants and loans, but this is outside the limited scope of the present
paper.6
2.2 Empirical tests
We seek to explain the differences in the temporal and cross-donor country mix
between loans and pure grants observed in past aid allocations, by using annual panel
data between 1970 and 1999 pooled across 17 member countries of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.4 We are guided in our choice of
explanatory variables by general economic logic, as no definite theory as such exists.
Thus, we test for the effects of the following:
i)  Level of donors’ per capita income: The higher the level of per capita income
of the donor country, the easier it should be for the donor to transfer resources
without any quid pro quo vis-à-vis expectations of future reverse flows. Hence,
we expect a higher level of per capita income to increase the share of grants in
total aid.
ii)  Economic (real GDP) growth: For the same reason and due to the fact that
economic growth increases donor’s resources, we expect high-income growth
to increase the preponderance of pure grants in the composition of aid.
iii)  The phase of economic cycle: Also, following the above reasoning, donors are
expected to find it more affordable to give more aid in the form of grants
during a rising phase of the economic cycle than during a recession.5
iv)  Size of government—government expenditure in relation to GDP: The size of
government captures (and is a proxy for) many factors regarding the
orientation and disposition of that government. While this overall effect is
unlikely to be neutral, its direction is not posited to be either way but remains
an issue to be determined only empirically.
v)  Ideological leaning of the donor government: As discussed earlier, there is
controversy as to whether multilateral development banks should give grants
or loans. The controversy is along the ideological line in the US (with left-
wing Democrats supporting status quo and right-wing Republicans agitating
for all-grants aid). Here, we seek to test whether this is an isolated case or a
distinguishing feature between left- and right-wing governments. To do this,
we test for the effects of two related ideological variables—first, the impact of
the executive arm being right-wing and second, the extent of both the
executive and legislative arms being right-wing. If the current pattern in the US
is the norm, we expect these two variables to have a positive effect on the
share of aid given in grant form over the years.6
                                                
4 The 17 DAC member countries covered by the study are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK and USA. The five new members (Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Spain) are excluded because of few data points available for their aid allocations, the amounts
involved are also relatively very small.
5 The phase of economic cycle is computed as the residuals obtained by regressing the logarithm of
index of real GDP on a time trend, so that positive values correspond to rising phase of the cycle.
6 According to the data source, the executive and legislative (majority) arms are each characterized as
being right-wing, central and left-wing and we assigned these values of 1, 0 and –1 respectively. For
the variable denoting the extent of both arms being right-wing, we simply add the extent of each arm
being right-wing so that its value ranges between –2 (if both arms are left-wing) and 2 (if both are
right-wing).7
vi)  Political constraints and checks and balances against executive arm of
government: As discussed in section 1, those opposed to the switch by
multilateral development banks to a higher proportion of grants have expressed
the fear that the legislative approval needed to replenish the resources of the
development banks might not be forthcoming. If this is correct, it can also be
inferred that the proposal to make grants directly available to recipient
countries would encounter similar objections from legislators. We attempt to
validate this notion by testing whether the extent to which the executive arm is
subject to checks and balances or constraints affects the mix between loans and
grants. Thus, we include two alternative indicators of the degree of checks and
balances in the political system as regressors in the equations. We also include
two alternative indicators of degree of political constraints on the executive
arm.7 Based on the aforementioned notion, a high value in each of these is
expected to reduce the share of grants in total aid volume.
vii)  Trend variable: As shown in Figure 1, there is an overall upward trend in the
share of aid given in form of grants. Here, we seek to test for whether the
positive trend still exists after controlling for the other explanatory variables
being discussed here.
viii)  Dummy variable for post-1990 period: As can be seen from Figure 1, the
upward momentum in the share of aid given as grants ceased after the mid-
1990s. This dummy variable is to control for the factors that are responsible for
this trend and we expect it to exhibit a negative effect.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the share of grants in total ODA is lower for direct
(bilateral) allocations to recipient countries than that of combined aid (direct and
indirect through multilateral donors like the WB, IMF, etc.). This is due to the fact that
almost all donor contributions to multilateral institutions are in the form of grants. But
the co-movements in the two charts are broadly the same—both rose more or less
steadily until around the mid-1990s and started declining thereafter.8 Despite this co-
movement, we still estimate separate regression equations for each. Table 1 gives the
regression results for the non-political explanatory variables, while Table 2 gives the
estimates that include the effects of political factors.9
                                                
7 The checks-and-balances indicator records the number of veto players in a polity and it indicates the
extent of formal constitutional control on political decisionmakers. The difference between the two
alternatives (which have a simple correlation coefficient of 0.767) is technical and its description as
given in the data source runs into pages. The political constraint indicator, on the other hand, tries to
measure the extent to which a change in the policy preferences of a veto player (independent arms of
government—executive, upper and lower legislative arms) may be frustrated in leading to a change in
government policy and it takes into account party composition of each arm of government and degree
of homogeneity within the ruling party as well as within the opposition. Again, the difference between
the two alternatives employed in the study (which have a simple correlation coefficient of 0.423) is
technical and its description as given in the data source runs into pages. In a sense, the two alternatives
have much in common with the two alternative indicators of checks and balances and the simple
correlation coefficients between its two alternatives and those of checks and balances range between
0.165 to 0.349.
8 The data source for ODA allocation is the OECD’s IDS (online) while the source on the political
ideology as well as checks and balances in the political system is Beck et al.(2000), available through
the World Bank Economic Growth Research website. The data on the indicator of political constraints
are from Heinz (forthcoming), also available online. All other variables are from World Bank (2001).
9 Because the panel data are unbalanced in the sense that there are missing values for countries in a non-
uniform manner, we include only few explanatory variables (such as the trend and per capita income)8
Table 1
Estimates of determinants of preponderance of grants in ODA:




















Dependent variable: combined bilateral and multilateral grants in relation
















































































Notes: (i) The dependent variable in the first three equations is the share of grants in ODA with
respect to combined multilateral and bilateral aid while the dependent variable in the last
three equations is the share of grants in ODA with respect to bilateral aid only;
(ii) The estimates are based on panel data for the 22 DAC donors and are derived through
fixed-effect (OLS) method;
(iii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute
sense, not less than 2.6, 2.0, and 1.6, respectively.
As it can be seen from the tables on the empirical results, the regression equations have
a good fit or explanatory power, judging by the high values of the adjusted R
2. In all
cases, the results are the same for the two types of equations: combined grants (bilateral
and multilateral) in relation to combined aid (bilateral and multilateral), as well as
bilateral grants in relation to bilateral aid. The signs of the coefficients of the
explanatory variables are in line with our expectation, except those of the level of per
capita income. Specifically, the coefficients of the level of per capita income are
negative and statistically significant in all equations, suggesting that the higher the level
of donor income, the smaller the fraction of their aid given as grants. This is contrary to
expectation. Economic growth and upturn in economic cycle are all positive and
statistically significant in most cases, suggesting that higher values of these two
variables would cause donors to increase the share of their aid given as grants. But the
coefficient of government expenditure-GDP ratio is negative and statistically
significant, suggesting that high size of the (donor) government reduces the fraction of
aid given as grants.
                                                                                                                                              
that are available for all countries for all or almost all years in all the equations estimated while other
explanatory variables are included just one at a time. We employed OLS technique (correcting for
possible existence of heteroscedasticity through the method of covariance matrix correction suggested
by White, 1980) and also fixed-effect method that permits intercept to vary across countries in
deriving the panel data estimates.9
Table 2
Estimates of determinants of preponderance of grants in ODA:


























Dependent variable: combined bilateral and multilateral grants in relation






































































































































































































































Notes:  (i) The dependent variable in the first three equations is the share of grants in ODA in relation
to combined multilateral and bilateral aid while the dependent variable in the last three
equations is the share of grants in ODA in relation to bilateral aid only;
(ii) The estimates are based on panel data for the 22 DAC donors and are derived through
fixed-effect (OLS) method;
(iii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute
sense, not less than 2.6, 2.0, and 1.6, respectively.
On the domestic polity front, the coefficients of the indicators for the executive arm of
donor government and the combined executive and legislative arms being ideologically
right-wing are positive and statistically significant in all cases. This evidence suggests
that support for grants instead of loans is generally characteristic of right-wing
governments and that the recent event in the US in connection with the multilateral10
Note: The average interest rate is expressed in per decile, which is percentage rate multiplied by 10.
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Fig. 2: Concessionality of official loans: grant elements (% of loans); average
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development banks is not an isolated case. But the results on the effects of checks and
balances as well as political constraints are not as robust because their coefficients miss
statistical significant test and, contrary to expectation, even one of the two alternative
indicators of checks and balances has a positive coefficient. Although the balance of11
evidence still indicates that the extent of checks and constraints on the preference of
executive arm (and, hence, aid agency) reduces the fraction of aid given as grants, the
evidence is weak, if not fragile.
The coefficients of the trend variable are positive and statistically significant in all
cases, in line with the apparent positive trend in Figure 1. Conversely, the coefficients
of the post-1990 dummy variable are negative and statistically very significant in all
equations, indicating that after controlling for other factors (including the continuing
rising trend in the fraction of aid given as grants in the preceding two decades), the post-
1990 period actually witnessed a decrease in donor inclination towards grants vis-à-vis
loans.
3 Possible repercussion of a switch from soft loan to grants on the aid volume
As discussed in section 1, a major premise of those opposed to the inclusion of grants in
the aid given by multilateral development banks (which, within the present context,
refers to only their soft lending windows, like the IDA of the World Bank group) is that
this would reduce the volume of aid through these banks. As argued, this is especially
so in subsequent years after the grant-induced cessation of replenishments or re-cycling
of current resource transfers begins to take its toll. A logical extension of this line of
thought is that the volume of aid given by bilateral donors would also be adversely
affected if these favoured a higher proportion of grants in their resource transfers to
recipients. This follows from the fact that these banks are the multilateral equivalents of
the national aid agencies being used as the vehicles or ‘intermediaries’ of donor
countries in giving aid. A corollary of this is that the resources available in the future to
multilateral ‘aid agencies’ for disbursement may or may not be affected by their current
grant-versus-loan policy, depending on whether the past grant-loan mix of the national
aid agencies affects the size of resources currently available to these aid agencies for
transfer.
3.1 Design of an econometric test
Based on the above logic, we conduct an econometric test to determine whether, and to
what extent the preponderance of grants in total aid in the past affects the current
volume of aid. Based on panel data derived from pooling annual data over the 1970-99
period across the 22 DAC bilateral donors, the test uses a fixed-effect method.10 This
enables us to infer the implications of the current grant-loan mix being adopted by
bilateral and, hence, multilateral donors on their respective future aid volumes. The
empirical test is carried out by including the current and lagged values of grants in
relation to total aid (ODA) as regressors in an equation for aid effort, defined as aid-
GDP ratio. Having controlled for the effects of the donor’s per capita income level and
population size as well as the trend factor and the post-1990 period, we continue to
increase the lag length specification from just the contemporaneous year to a maximum
                                                
10 The methodology is exactly as used for the results in Table 1, and the same data sources apply. We
could not test directly whether the past grant-loan mix of the developments banks affects the volume
of their current disbursable resources (and, hence, whether their current grant-loan mix would affect
their disbursable resources in the future) because banks hardly give grants.12
of a 5-year lag. If reflows are being re-cycled as new resource transfers, we not only
expect the share of grants in total aid to exhibit a negative sign but also the cumulative
negative effects to increase as we increase the lag specification. In other words, the
reducing-effect of grants on resources currently available for donor transfers should
continue to build up the more we consider the past grants-total aid ratio.
3.2 Empirical results—general
The empirical results which are reported in Table 3, show that the equations have a
fairly good fit (judging by the moderately high adjusted R
2 values). Also, the
coefficients of most regressors are statistically significant. Those of per capita income
are positive, suggesting that a high level of per capita income increases aid effort. The
coefficient of population size is negative, suggesting the presence of economies of scale
in aid giving. Also, the coefficients of the post-1990 dummy variable are negative while
those of the trend factor are positive, suggesting that the trend increase in the generosity
ratio over the years was tempered during post-1990 period.
3.3 Empirical results on effects of past grant-loan mix on current aid effort
The coefficient of contemporaneous grant-total aid ratio is negative and statistically
significant, suggesting that a high ratio of grants in total aid reduces the aid volume
during the same period. This is understandable since the present value or opportunity
cost to the donor of a dollar grant (which, by definition, has no chance of generating any
future financial reflow) should exceed that of a dollar loan (which may generate some
reflow in the future as interest payments and/or principal repayment). Donors, as
rational economic agents seeking to maximize whatever benefits are being sought
through the resource transfers, will have factored this into their calculus with regard to
their decision on the volume of aid. For this same reason, one should similarly expect an
immediate reduction in the aid volume given by development banks, should they shift to
grants. In principle, shifting from a soft loan scheme with x% grant element to a pure
grant scheme would be expected to reduce the volume of resource transfers to x% of the
former level.
However, the results do not show that resource transfers are influenced at present by
reflows currently generated from past loans—and, hence, by reflows that are today
being forgone because of past transfers in form of grants. This is because the observed
cumulative negative effects of an earlier high grant ratio cease to increase after the
second year, and may even appear to decrease. One explanation for this is that donor
countries probably do not often finance new transfers from the proceeds of reflows.
Another explanation is that past loans do not, in practice, generate significant reflows in
subsequent years due to debt and/or interest rescheduling and refinancing on the part of
debtor countries so that current reflows being sacrificed because of past pro-grant policy
would be minimal.
Given this observation whereby the current resource transfer decision by individual
donors appears to be immune from reflows currently generated from past loans (or,
conversely, currently being forgone from a preponderance of grants in past transfers),
one can ask whether the same inference can be extended to multilateral development
banks—which have not had the experience of giving grants in the past. The answer13
depends on the existence and extent of the fallacy of composition. On one hand, one can
contend that the same should be applicable to the multilateral banks. Institutionally, the
benefactors of the banks (who ultimately make the resources available) are essentially
the same donor countries that, at the individual level, do not allow reflows from past
loans to influence the transfers they are making bilaterally. Since they also ultimately
control the multilateral banks and, hence, take final responsibility for the banks’
accomplishments or failures, the benefactors collectively would probably make the
banks do what they do bilaterally with respect to national aid agencies. Arguably, it can
be assumed that if a particular development bank is about to be incapacitated because its
resources are becoming depleted due to inadequate reflows, the benefactors would make
more resources available through consultations, lobbying, politics, or whatever other
means they can adopt to mount pressure among themselves—as they have often done in
connection with past IDA replenishment negotiations.
On the other hand, however, this line of reasoning is flawed if a fallacy of composition
exists whereby individual decisions (in connection with bilateral resource transfers) of
the donor countries controlling the multilateral banks are at odds with the collective
decision concerning the banks. The possibility of a fallacy of composition is enhanced
because resource transfers via development banks do not confer self-interest on the
donor countries in the same manner and to the degree that bilateral transfers do. For
example, procurement-tying of aid is not feasible with transfers through multilateral
channels. In addition, it is possible that the inability of the grant-loan mix of national aid
agencies to affect the volume of currently disbursable resources is due to loan default or
rescheduling and refinancing by debtor nations. This is a feature less applicable to
multilateral lending since, unlike national donors, multilateral institutions are preferred
creditors (or are almost preferred creditors, as in the case of the IDA). Also, to the
Table 3
Estimates of effects of preponderance of grants in ODA on aid volume
(ODA aid/GDP ratio)


























































































































































































































Notes:  (i) The dependent variable is the aid effort, defined as aid volume as a fraction of GDP;
(ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute
sense, not less than 2.6, 2.0, and 1.6, respectively.14
extent that the clients of the multilateral lenders graduate to a status that classifies them
as fairly rich or less poor, they become ineligible borrowers. This makes refinancing
(borrowing to repay maturing loans) less damaging to the volume of reflows to
multilateral banks than is the case with national aid agencies. All these factors may, in
the case of multilateral development banks, temper the applicability of our empirical
observations, which are based on the statistics for bilateral donors.
4 Effects of grant-loan mix on financial discipline adopted
by recipient governments
As pointed out in section 1, one of the argument against IFIAC’s (2000)
recommendation of grant-funding by multilateral development banks is that the
inevitability of loan repayment helps to build financial discipline and efficient
utilization of funds in the borrowing countries. This is another way of stating the
economic theory that free commodities (and, hence, pure grants) would be used up to
the point where its marginal productivity or utility is zero and, hence, with less
efficiency than subsidized commodities which have positive opportunity costs.
However, this analogy is tempered by the fact that pure grants are not free as such, since
they are being rationed (presumably, more than subsidized or concessional loans)
among recipients on the basis of economic, political and other conditionalities. The
question, therefore, arises as to whether concessional loans, in practice, are being more
efficiently utilized by recipient governments than grants.
4.1 Design of empirical test
This is an empirical issue which, however, is not straightforward to test, especially
when it comes to determining what is an appropriate indicator of efficiency in
government spending. Nevertheless, we make an attempt by examining the effects of
foreign grants in relation to current net receipts of foreign loans on other state-budget
items; specifically, capital and current expenditure as well as tax revenue and domestic
sources of financing deficits in relation to both the GDP and total government
expenditure. In this regard, the only previous study we know which has examined the
relative effects of grants and loans on the state budget and, hence, on the recipients is
that of Khan and Hoshino (1992). Their empirical analysis suggests that grants and
loans have different effects on recipient government’s investment and taxation
behaviour.
Within the context of the study, we take efficiency to mean the enhancement of
government capital (or investment) spending and tax revenue as well as reduction of
each of the following: the budget size (or total spending), current (or consumption)
spending, and domestic sources of financing fiscal deficits. While these are
controvertible as indicators of fiscal efficiency or the lack of it, this is in line with
conventional wisdom in the fiscal reform literature, where reduced government size,
recurrent spending, and domestic sources of deficit financing are typically characterized
as being ‘good’ policies, just as are the promotion of government investment spending
(e.g., on infrastructure) and tax revenue effort. So, if the hypothesis that grants are prone
to be less efficiently utilized than loans is correct, one would expect grants in relation to
total aid (i.e., combined grants and loans) to have negative effects on capital expenditure15
and tax revenue as well as positive effects on total expenditure, current expenditure and
domestic sources of deficit financing.
We carry out the tests by estimating regression equations with annual panel data over
periods that fall within 1970-99, pooled across 72 developing countries that have not
been significant petroleum oil exporters.11 We also report separate estimates for 42 of
them that are low-income countries and 30 high-income.12 We control for the effects of
a number of other factors that could also have affected the budgetary items by including
these in the estimated equations. These other factors are the trend variable, level of per
capita income (in logarithm), and the overall aid volume (combined loans and grants) in
relation to the gross national income. The estimated equations, in effect, can be regarded
as modified reduced-form equivalents of Heller (1975) type of fiscal response model
framework. The OLS technique is applied to the panel data, using the fixed-effect
method as well as the technique suggested by White (1980) for heteroscedasticity
correction. However, the appropriateness of the OLS method would be compromised to
the extent that the volume (and grant-loan mix) of foreign assistance is, in turn,
determined by the spending, taxing and domestic financing of deficit decisions, in
which case these regressors would be endogenous. While this is possible to an extent,
the effect would be limited if the government is faced with binding constraints in
receiving foreign grants and concessional loans, as has often been the practice
(particularly, with respect to grants). Another reason why the effect would be limited is
due to the fact that it takes time before a decision to seek a foreign loan or grant
translates into an actual disbursement by the donor. Despite this, we still allow for such
endogeneity by including, instead of contemporaneous, 1-year lagged values of both
grants-total aid ratio and overall aid volume in relation to gross national income.
4.2 General observations from the empirical results
The empirical results are reported in Table 4, which indicates that the equations have a
good fit in most cases, judging by the generally high values of the adjusted R
2. Also,
based on the statistical significance of the coefficients of the trend variable, the share of
total government expenditure in the GDP has, after controlling for the effects of various
regressors, been on the increase over the decades, as a result of an even faster rate of
increase in the share of government consumption expenditure that has been tempered by
a falling share of capital expenditure in the GDP. Similarly, the tax revenue-GDP ratio
exhibits a rising trend while no specific trend movement is discernible in the ratio of
                                                
11 Petroleum exporting countries are excluded not only because grants do not constitute large items in
their budgets but also because their fiscal behaviour might have been overshadowed with vagaries of
petroleum export-based government revenue.
12 The threshold per capita income which classifies a country as high-income is US$ 1,000 (1995 dollar
value) per annum, averaged over 1970-99 period. The 30 countries belonging to this category are
Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Fiji, Guatemala, Hungary, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Morocco, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and
Uruguay. Low-income countries, on the other hand, are Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Côte
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Syria, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.16
domestic deficit financing sources to GDP. While consumption expenditure has been
rising faster than total expenditure, tax revenue and domestic sources of deficit
financing appear to be rising at about the same pace as total expenditure.
Also, in both groups of countries, a high level of per capita income is found to reduce
the share of government consumption spending in GDP (and also in total expenditure).
It is also found to increase the share of government investment spending. The overall
result is that it has no effect on the share of total spending in GDP. A high level of per
capita income also increases tax revenue in relation to both GDP and total government
expenditure, but has the opposite effect on domestic sources of deficit financing. The
volume of aid received in relation to gross national income, on the other hand, is found
to have a positive effect on the share of government capital spending in GDP, with the
effect on consumption spending share in GDP being practically flat. Thus, an overall
positive effect on total spending-GDP ratio (and, hence, negative effect on government
consumption-total spending ratio) is recorded. Consistent effects of aid-national income
ratio on either tax-GDP ratio or tax-total expenditure ratio are not discernible, in view of
statistical insignificance of the coefficients. The same is true of its effects on the
domestic sources of deficit financing in relation to GDP—and, for the high-income
countries, in relation to total expenditure also whereas it is found to reduce it in the low-
income country group. Except the case just mentioned, the results discussed so far are
the same for the high- and low-income country groups.
4.3 Specific observation: effects of ratio of grants to total aid
The effects of the grant-total aid ratio differ in most cases substantially between the
low- and high-income country groups. While it increases the share of both total and
consumption expenditures in GDP in high-income countries, its effect is flat in the low-
income countries. It exhibits negative effect on the share of government capital
spending in GDP, with the effect being statistically significant for the high-income
group but misses significance test for the low-income group. Consequently, a high
grant-total aid ratio also records a positive effect on the share of government
consumption spending in the total budget and this is statistically significant for both the
low- and high-income groups. Thus, based on all the evidence here, grants, more than
official loans, promote consumption spending and retard investment spending  in
relation to GDP (in high-income developing countries) and in relation to total budget
size in both high- and low-income developing countries.
Its effect on tax revenue in relation to GDP is positive and statistically significant in
high-income countries while the opposite is the case for low-income countries, where it
is found to have a statistically significant negative effect. Concerning tax revenue in
relation to total expenditure, the grant-total aid ratio is found to have a negative effect in
both high- and low-income countries. Thus, while the evidence on tax effort is mixed
for the high-income countries (where it increases the tax-GDP ratio but reduces tax-
expenditure ratio), a high preponderance of grants in total aid is found to reduce both
tax-GDP and tax-expenditure ratios in low-income countries.17
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Notes:  (i) Ratio of grants to aid is computed from the OECD’s IDS (online), while other variables are
from the World Bank (online);
(ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute18
sense, no less than 2.6, 2.0, and 1.6, respectively.
Its effect on domestic sources of financing deficit in relation to both GDP and total
expenditure is positive but statistically significant only at the margin for high-income
countries, whereas it is not statistically significant at all for the low-income group. Thus,
one can infer that there is some weak evidence that a high ratio of grants in total aid
volume increases domestic financing of deficit in relation to both GDP and total
government spending in high-income countries but has practically no effect on this
source of deficit financing in low-income countries.
The conclusion from the above findings is that, to the extent that increased government
size, increased share of government consumption spending in the budget and in GDP, as
well as reduced share of government investment spending in GDP and in total budget
can be said to be inefficient, grants are being utilized less efficiently than official loans.
This same inference is valid with respect to the relative effect of grants and loans on the
tax effort, especially in low-income countries. In high-income countries, the
corresponding inference is mixed, as the tax-GDP ratio in these nations is favoured by
grants more than by loans but not enough to match the higher favourable effect on
government total expenditure. While a high preponderance of grants in total aid is
observed to have no effect on the domestic financing of deficit in low-income countries,
the balance of evidence indicates that it has a positive impact in high-income countries.
This, again, is anti-efficiency, as has generally been perceived in fiscal reform literature.
Thus, the left-wing argument seems to have been supported.
5 Effects of degree of subsidy on loans on rate of debt accumulation
and efficient loan use
Concessional or soft loans are simply an alternative way of referring to loans which
should technically be called subsidized. Thus, the effects of different degrees of softness
or concessionality can be analysed and theoretically predicted on the basis of the
economic theory on subsidy of a commodity or factor input. Accordingly, one can
theoretically predict that, similarly to the manner in which the subsidization of
commodities and resources encourages their increased consumption or usage, there is a
tendency on the part of the recipients to over-borrow when a loan is subsidized, as in the
case of ODA. Therefore, the softness of these loans can partly explain the official
accumulation of debt over time, especially by poor countries. Furthermore, if it can be
established that the high degree of softness has a positive effect on the rate of
borrowing, then it can also be inferred that this fact would also retard the efficient use of
such loans. Determining empirically whether the above theories are true in real life is
the attempt being made here.
The degree of concessionality of a loan is measured by the implied grant element in
relation to the face value of the loan. This indicator takes due cognizance of both the
average rate of interest on the loan as well as the grace period, which is the timeframe
before repayment of the principal (and, possibly, interest payments as well) commences.
The lower the loan rate or the longer the grace period, the higher the grant element.
Fluctuations in the grant element (percentage), average interest rates (decile or per cent
multiplied by 10), and grace period (in months) over the 1970-99 period are presented
in Figure 2. As can be seen, movements in the grant element are mainly due to opposite19
fluctuations in loan rates while the effect of grace period movement on the grant
element is much less obvious.
5.1 Design of the econometric test
The study attempts to test whether the degree of loan subsidy (or grant element in
relation to a loan’s face value) with respect to official loans has any (positive,
presumably) effect on the rate of official borrowing, as economic theory would have us
believe. We also test whether the effect of grant element reflects the recipient
government’s response to a lower interest rate, longer grace period, or both. For this, we
again utilize a regression analysis framework. We estimate equations for the volume of
(gross) official loans raised in relation to GDP and separately include the grant element
percentage; the average interest charged on the loans, and the average grace period on
the loans as the explanatory variables of interest. But we also control for the effects of
other factors likely to determine the volume of official loans. Specifically, these other
factors are the trend variable, economic (real GDP) growth, and existing total debt stock
in relation to GDP. Similar to the results given in Table 4, the equations are estimated
with annual panel data over periods that fall within 1970-99, pooled across the same 72
developing countries while also deriving separate estimates for the 42 low-income and
30 high-income countries. Also, as before, the OLS technique is applied to the panel
data, using fixed-effect method and the technique suggested by White (1980) for
heteroscedasticity correction.
5.2 General observations from the empirical results
The resulting estimates are presented in Table 5, which shows that they have fairly a
high goodness of fit, as indicated by the values of their adjusted R
2. In all cases, the
coefficients are statistically very significant for both the high- and low-income country
groups. The exception is the coefficient of total debt stock-GNP ratio, which is not
significant in the equations for low-income countries. But, while the coefficients of the
trend variable are positive for low-income countries, they are negative for the high-
income ones. This suggests that while the volume of official loans in relation to GDP
shows an upward trend in the low-income countries, the opposite is true for the high-
income countries. This is probably a reflection of the fact that high-income countries
have relatively ever-improving access to the alternative of raising loan finance from
foreign private capital markets.
A high level of per capita income is also observed to have reduced the rate of official
borrowing, whereas high economic growth is seen to have increased it. The coefficients
of per capita income are negative, while those of economic growth are positive. The
existing level of total debt stock in relation to GNP has a positive effect on current
borrowing in high-income countries (presumably, for refinancing maturing debts) but
has no statistically significant effect on current borrowing in low-income countries.
5.3 Specific observation effects of degree of concessionality
and its components on borrowing
The empirical results are straightforward. The coefficient of the grant element
percentage is positive and statistically very significant, just as is the coefficient of the20
grace period, while the coefficient of the average interest rate is negative and
statistically very significant. The results are the same for the high- and low-income
countries and, hence, for the combination of the two country groups.
What this evidence suggests is that a high degree of concessionality on official loans is
an incentive for the recipient governments to borrow more and they respond equally to
both types of incentives—low interest rate and long grace period. This suggests that
recipients have a high rate of intertemporal substitution elasticity or time preference.
Could this have been an explanation of the high and often unsustainable debt burden in
many of these countries in the past—a phenomenon that triggered the palliative HIPC
debt relief?
The observation that recipients respond to the incentive of a longer grace period by
borrowing more has a particular implication for the Meltzer Report’s recommendation
(IFIAC 2000) which concerns performance-based grants for recipients that the report
refers to as ‘the globe’s truly poor’. These grants, in effect, boil down to subsidized
loans without a grace period. This is because the ‘globe’s truly poor’ would have to
co-finance projects (to the tune of between 10-90 per cent, depending on how ‘truly
poor’ the recipient is) with the multilateral donors and this requires an up-front cash
outlay on the recipient’s part. Based on the specific example used in the report whereby
the recipient co-finances 30 per cent of the cost of vaccination of the country’s
Table 5






































































































































































Notes: (i) The dependent variable is official loans received in relation to GDP;
(ii) All variables are from the World Bank (online);
  (iii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter21
estimate is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute
sense, no less than 2.6, 2.0, and 1.6, respectively;
(iv) The coefficients and t-values of the grant element and average interest rate regressors are
for their respective contemporaneous and 1-period lagged values.
children against measles, this is equivalent to financing the entire project with a
concessional loan with a 70 per cent grant element, but with no grace period, so that the
30 per cent effective loan is to be repaid upfront. As observed, recipients react to a
longer grace period by borrowing more (suggesting a high rate of discount or time
preference), and the implication here is that they would be less than enthusiastic to such
a co-financing grant arrangement. Recipients—typically liquidity- or foreign exchange-
constrained—are unlikely to be excited by an offer that would require them to
co-finance such projects.
Following from the above evidence is a somewhat corollary issue—whether high
concessionality generally reduces the efficiency of the use of loan proceeds. In this case,
we need not resort to empirical tests, since a deductive approach can provide an answer.
If recipient governments are induced by concessionality to borrow more than what
credit market conditions suggest, they would be prone to finance and implement
projects and programmes beyond what market-determined criteria permit and would
thereby undertake those that miss normal efficiency criteria. However, this conclusion is
limited or qualified by non-efficiency factors identified in section 6 below.
6 Donors’ choice between grants, soft loans and non-concessional loans: some
evidence and suggested guiding criteria
The evidence reported in the previous two sections seems to suggest that grants are
being utilized relatively inefficiently vis-à-vis official loans, and loans with greater
concessionality are prone to be over-borrowed and, hence, less efficiently used than
loans with lesser concessionality. But this generalization has a number of caveats. First,
efficiency should not be the only guiding factor for donors and, second, even efficiency-
wise, there are many recipient-specific circumstances where grants would do better than
loans, and loans with a greater degree of concessionality do better than other loans.
Within the constraint dictated by space, we shall briefly allude to a number of such
instances in this section. These instances constitute circumstances in which grants, soft
loans and non-concessional loans have their respective comparative advantage—factors
that donors should take into consideration in splitting their overall envelope of planned
resource transfers between the three categories.
6.1 Recipient-specific factors affecting donors’ grant-loan mix and the nature of
loan concessionality
Before identifying such circumstances, we want to examine the evidence on the
recipient-specific factors that donors have taken into account in the past in deciding
their grant-loan mix and the extent and type of concessionality (i.e., lower interest rate
versus longer grace period) on their lending. For this, we follow the earlier regression
analysis technique by estimating a type of implied donor ‘reaction function’ equations.
In this regard, donors are posited to react to certain recipient-specific circumstances and
factors in deciding the mix between grants and official loans, and also the degree of
concessionality as well as the interest rate and grace period combination to achieve a22
certain degree of concessionality.13 These equations are estimated with annual panel
data over the 1970-99 period, pooled across the same 72 recipient countries covered in
connection with Tables 4 and 5. The econometric methodology adopted earlier is also
applied here. There are five equations, each for a separate dependent variable. The first
is pure grants in relation to total net volume of aid; the second is pure grants in relation
to gross volume of aid (i.e., volume of aid before deducting loan repayment); the third is
the grant element in relation to the face value of official loans; the fourth is the average
interest rate on the loans, and the fifth is the grace period on the loans. These five
equations have a common list of four regressors, which are the trend variable, recipient
country’s per capita income level, the recipient country’s economic (real GDP) growth,
and the recipient country’s existing total debt stock in relation to GNP. These latter
three regressors are the factors we want to test with regard to their impact in shaping the
decisions of the donors with respect to the grant-loan mix and loan concessionality.
While we expect greater grant-loan ratio and higher loan concessionality to be given to
countries with lower per capita income, we are not positing a definite direction of the
effects of economic growth and existing total debt-GDP ratio.
The empirical results are reported in Table 6. Judging from the values of the adjusted
R
2, the equations have a good fit, except in the case of the equation for grant-net aid
volume ratio. Based on the statistical significance of the coefficients, the following
donor reactions with regard to the grant-loan mix and loan concessionality were
observed in the factors tested:
i)  Grants in relation to total net aid volume: Donors’ grant-net loan mix given to
(or obtained by) the recipients, although showing a rather feeble upward trend
in favour of grants, is not influenced by the recipients’ level of per capita
income, economic growth performance, or existing stock of debt in relation to
GDP.
ii)  Grants in relation to total gross aid volume: Although the grant-gross loan mix
records an upward trend over the decades in favour of grants, it is not
influenced by the recipients’ economic growth performance. There is some
evidence, however, that donors give countries with lower per capita income (or
countries with lower per capita income obtain) a greater preponderance of
grants. That per capita income is not a relevant factor in the case of the grant-
net loan situation above has to be due to the fact that lower-income recipients
use a higher proportion of their gross loan proceeds than the higher-income
recipients to repay existing official debt stocks about to mature. Also, the fact
that donors are now found to give a higher grant-gross loan ratio the higher the
existing level of total debt stock/GNP ratio (as reported in the Table) can be
easily reconciled with the evidence in (i), since much of the new gross lending
has often been mutually agreed to be used for servicing and refinancing the
existing debt stock.
                                                
13 The assumption here is that the observed grant-loan mix and concessionality on loans are as
determined by the donors. While this is normally expected to be true in most cases, the observed
volume of concessional loans (and, hence, the observed grant-loan mix) might have actually been
jointly decided by recipients and donors. This possible exception should be borne in mind in
interpreting the observed grant-loan mix as portraying the donors’ observed reaction to recipient-
specific economic circumstances.23
iii)  Grant element ratio on official loans received: This exhibits an increasing
trend over the decades.14 Also, donors give greater loan concessions to
countries having lower per capita income, higher economic growth
performance, and lower external debt stock/GNP ratio.
iv)  Average interest rate on official loans: This exhibits a decreasing trend over
the years. Also, it follows that the greater concessionality in (iii) above is
partly effected by reducing the interest rate charged on loans to countries with
lower per capita income, higher economic growth performance, and lower
external debt stock/GNP ratio.
v)  Grace period on official loans: The grace period allowed by donors shows the
same rising trend as the grant element ratio and donors are observed to be
influenced by the same set of factors and along the same directions as reported
in (iii) above for the grant element ratio.
6.2 Respective comparative advantages of grants, soft loans and non-concessional
loans
At the national level all over the world, governments offer some sort of subsidy on
selected commodities, resources and public enterprises, as well as provide some
commodities and resources free of charge. Ideally, such subsidies and grants should be
based on certain principles that have been long established in public finance theory. We
identify some of these principles and extend them to the realm of official transfers by
donor governments. Due to space limitations, a more formal expositions is not possible,
and we offer only an ‘intuitive’ presentation.
i)  Externality: If the benefits accruing to the recipient governments from
undertaking or financing certain activities are less than the total benefits to the
whole world, such activities, in the absence of foreign assistance, would not
normally be undertaken to the optimal extent. Many instances of such activities
can be mentioned and one special case is the global public goods provision
(which, at the same time, confers substantial benefits to the recipient
country).15 To encourage such activities, a grant is likely to be better than a
non-concessional loan.
ii)  Self-interest of donors: This is similar to (i) above, but also different. Here, the
activities to be financed are not necessarily beneficial to the whole world. The
activity only needs to be beneficial to the donors and, possibly, to the
recipients, but nothing prevents the activity from being detrimental to the
                                                
14 The rising or falling trend being reported here and in other tables on the empirical results is after
controlling for a number of factors (namely, other regressors in the equation estimates). This should
not be confused with the trend movements in Figures 1 and 2, which reflect no controlling measures
for other factors.
15 It should be borne in mind that foreign resource transfers for financing truly global public goods are
not aid (and should not be regarded as such) since the benefit is not exclusively, mainly or even
preferentially for the (usually, developing) country where the provision takes place. This explains the
proviso of simultaneous presence of  ‘substantial benefits to the recipient country’—e.g., eradication
of an epidemic originating in a particular country might benefit that country more than the rest of the
world.24
global community. As such, it mainly applies to bilateral resource transfers.
Military and strategic assistance is a case in point, just as procurement-tied aid.
Again, to encourage recipients undertake such activities, grants would be more
suitable than non-concessional loans. Such a resource transfer already has an
implied non-financial forbearance or quid pro quo on the part of the recipients
and, simultaneously, an implied non-financial advantage to the donors.
iii)  Encouraging or cajoling recipients to ‘behave’ or undertake action as donors
feel they should be done: This is an amalgam of (i) and (ii) above. In a number
of cases, donors have their peculiar idiosyncrasies and may see things
differently than the recipient governments perceive them and the former may
wish to use their financial power to leverage, cajole, induce, or ‘bribe’ (if not
‘intimidate’) the latter to ‘behave’. Many social, political and economic
conditionalities that accompany resource transfers fall into this category, e.g.
gender issue, democratization, fighting corruption, privatization and
commercialization of public enterprises, macroeconomic reforms (that have
nothing to do with capacity to repay loans), etc. No specific self-interest of the
donor is obvious and it mainly (though not exclusively) applies to multilateral
transfers. No doubt, a number of such conditionalities are genuine attempts to
induce and encourage recipients to help themselves. But donors, for
effectiveness, have to pay a price to induce the recipients to manage their
affairs as the benefactors would like to see them and, hence, non-concessional
loans would not be appropriate.
iv)  Temporary economic shocks versus long-lasting downturn: The ultimate
benefit of loans to the recipients is to enable them smoothen their consumption
over a feasible time horizon. So, if a potential recipient’s problem is just a
temporary, reversible ‘liquidity’ shortfall and possible future recovery is
supported by the fundamentals being in place, loans would be more
appropriate than grants. But if a potential recipient is having a protracted
‘solvency’ problem that is likely to be long lasting, providing loans may
worsen the country’s situation. As reviewed in section 2.1 in connection with
gift-giving at the household level, Thomas and Worrall (2002) averred that,
‘Should it (i.e., the household suffering from an economic shock) then
immediately suffer another adverse shock, it is in a worse position than after
the first shock as it has repayment obligations on the borrowing already made,
and being less willing to accumulate even more debt, it will be forced to cut
consumption’. The same applies to sovereign recipient states.
v)  Altruistic and compassionate transfers: Transfers to low-income countries to
assist them in attaining certain standards of living would fall under this
category and should be distinguished from transfers to encourage recipient
governments to behave in a certain manner as mentioned in (iii) above. The
well-recognized principle of gift-giving (reviewed in section 2.1) suggests that
this aid should be in form of grants.
vi)  Correction of and ‘atonement’ or ‘reparation’ for past misdeeds: Examples of
this might include any bilateral transfer to correct for the past adversities from
colonization and slavery in Africa, or the writing-off of dubious loans that had
propped-up tyrants in developing countries during the cold war era, etc. Again,25
the well-recognized principle of gift-giving suggests that this should be in form
of grants.
vii)  Purpose for which transfers are being sought: If a recipient government is
seeking aid transfers to assist the poorer segments of the population (e.g.,
safety nets, scholarships to the poor, etc.), again, the principle of gift-giving
suggests that grants would be more appropriate. But if the transfers are being
sought for allocation to the recipient’s private sector (as part of private sector
development assistance), a case can be made for non-concessional loans, so as
not to compromise resource allocation efficiency. In this connection, it is
relevant to refer to the right-wing political argument of the IFIAC (2000)
report that the provision of infrastructure, etc. has a long gestation period
before yielding compensatory returns and hence should not be financed by
multilateral development banks through loans but through grants. Technically,
this is a faulty argument as loans can be appropriate and do not even need to be
concessional; only the grace period needs to be sufficiently long for this type
of transfer.
The discussion so far has centred on the comparative advantage of grants versus
(presumably, non-concessional) loans. We now want to see how concessional loans can
fit into the picture. The justification for concessional loans can unambiguously be made
in connection with some special cases of (i) to (iii) above, namely, to encourage
recipients to undertake more activities with positive externalities; to further donors’
self-interests, and to encourage recipients to behave or undertake certain measures in a
donor-preferred way. In the first case, positive externality may not be sufficient to
justify pure grants, thus requiring a form of ‘co-financing’ on the part of the recipients.
Such co-financing may be implemented better in the form of subsidized loans. These
co-financing or concessional loan arrangements may be suitable if a donor’s self-
interest is not intense enough to warrant a pure grant. For example, if a bilateral donor
wants to give procurement-tied aid to promote its exports, giving a $x million grant may
not go far enough compared with giving $4x million soft loan with a 25 per cent (i.e., $x
million) grant element. Regarding the appropriateness of soft loans as an instrument of
inducing the recipient to manage its affairs in a certain, donor-preferred manner,
Meltzer’s Report (IFIAC 2000) rightly gives this implicit recognition and approval in its
recommendation of ‘institutional reform loans’. While the report frowns on loans in
general, it makes an exception here. In recommending a soft loan arrangement, the
report (IFIAC: Chapter 3) states that, ‘developing and emerging countries need
incentives to continue long-term reform programmes until they achieve sustainable
results’. It then details how the reform incentive loan, the concessionality of which
would be tailored for the successful implementation of a reform programme, is to be
implemented. According to the report (IFIAC: Chapter 3):
Loans would be conditional upon a precise set of reforms, and
disbursement would begin after legislative enactment, the first step in the
process. If performance is positive, repayment of the entire principal
schedule would be deferred for one year. Interest would be on a current
basis – Eligibility for deferrals, based on continuing implementation,
would be renewable each year for (say) up to ten years. Continued
execution can thus transform (say) a 10-year loan with repayment spread
over (say) years 1 to 10 into (say) a 20-year loan with repayments in
(say) years 11 through 20. Failure to meet standards in any year would26
trigger a mandatory start on repayment of principal and elimination of
the interest subsidy.
Another instance where subsidized loans would be ‘optimal’ is when there is the need to
exploit the vulnerability of voters and pressure groups, etc. to the illusion of subsidized
loans. At times, donor governments may be justifiably inclined to provide grants (say,
$x million) for a specific purpose but may be handicapped by domestic opposition from
voters, pressure groups and, possibly, the legislators. Such opposition would probably
be weakened if these transfers were made by changing the grants into soft loans (say,
$4x million loans with a 25 per cent grant element). In such situations, soft loans (in
form of subtle or disguised grants) might be more suitable than outright grants.
Except in cases similar to those identified above, concessional loans may be sub-
optimal vis-à-vis outright grants and non-concessional loans. Unfortunately, not many
of the past aid decisions on the grant-loan mix have consciously been made on the basis
of such criteria.
Table 6
Estimates of effects of per capita income and economic growth on grants-loans mix


































Grant elements in relation

































Notes: (i) Ratio of grants to aid is computed from the OECD’s IDS (online), while other variables are
from the World Bank (online);
(ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter
estimate is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute
sense, not less than 2.6, 2.0, and 1.6, respectively.
7 Unbundling of subsidized loans into constituent pure grant
and non-concessional loan parts
What the foregoing discussion suggests is that with the exclusion of the exceptional
circumstances identified above, subsidized loans vis-à-vis non-concessional loans and
outright grants are generally inefficient in accomplishing donor objectives. As also
suggested by economic theory and our empirical findings, subsidization tends to
encourage over-borrowing by recipients. This leads to greater accumulation of debt over
time, which makes loan subsidization a disadvantage compared to non-concessional
loans or pure grants. The past debt overhang of many poor countries could partly be
explained by earlier inducements to borrow through high concessionality. Also,
financial discipline would ordinarily be less with soft loans than with non-concessional27
loans. With soft loans, project and programme selections are likely to be less prudent
(with those having low combined private and social rates of return being included) and
their implementation less efficiency-conscious.
The relative disadvantages of concessional loans are made worse by the adverse ‘push’
incentives. Donors (particularly, multilateral development banks) actively encourage
(and possibly intimidate) the recipients to borrow more, and by this, fail to process to
promote efficient utilization of the loan proceeds. A multilateral development bank
often measures its progress mainly in terms of loan volumes and often also links the
evaluation and progress of its staff to this target. This is a known fact but Wapenhans
Report (1992) and Meltzer’s Report in particular (IFIAC 2000) are probably among the
first to highlight it and bring it into the fore, using World Bank lending as illustration.
According to the IFIAC report (Chapter 3):
The (Wapenhans) report said the (World) Bank had developed a lending culture.
Rewards were closely related to the volume of lending, not to a project’s value or
program accomplishments. Subsequently, an Asian Development Bank portfolio
review found that dedication to client interest was undermined by an ‘approval
culture’ aimed at achieving yearly lending targets. Incentives to lend for lending’s
sake are built into the structure of the Banks. Internal budget resources are awarded
where loan volumes are high, not where the number of worthwhile projects is
highest. … Often the staff is rewarded on the amount of funds disbursed.
With pure grants, such an incentive problem would not arise. Also, in case of non-
concessional loans, the incentive may exist but it would be much more difficult to
persuade recipients to borrow more. Soft loans are the most vulnerable in this regard. As
opined by the IFIAC (Chapter 3), ‘The burden of irresponsible (loan) programmes is
unfortunately borne by taxpayers—by the poor recipient-country citizens if loans are
repaid or by donor member constituencies if the debt is forgiven’.
But despite these shortcomings, much of the official loans still continues to be
concessional. This is particularly so with resource transfers by multilateral development
banks through even their so-called non-concessional windows (IBRD, in the case of the
World Bank group). As asserted in Meltzer’s Report (IFIAC 2000: Chapter 3) on the
basis of their computations, ‘The (multilateral development) Banks divide their lending
into market-based and concessional loans. Both are subsidized’.
Concessional loans are, in effect, grants and non-concessional loans bundled together
and given to the recipient in a ‘take it or leave it’ manner. The question that arises is
whether it would not be more efficient and beneficial if the soft loan is unbundled into
two constituent parts and the recipient is given the grant component and a choice to take
(without further questioning or additional conditionality) as much as it wishes from the
non-concessional loan component.
For example, let us consider the case of a $4x million soft loan with 25 per cent (or $x
million) grant element. This is, in effect, a combination of an $x million grant and $3x
million non-concessional loan. The recipient either takes the whole $4x million or
nothing (or, possibly, a rigid 1:3 combination of grant and non-concessional loan if the
amount needed is less than $4x million). Since the effective generosity (or opportunity
cost to the donor) is $x million, the donor would have nothing to lose if it offers an $x
million outright grant, coupled with free access (‘no-further-conditionality’) to the28
implied $3x million non-concessional loan component. There is no disadvantage to the
donor in granting this option and the recipient is likely to exhibit greater discipline in
project/programme selection and implementation in utilizing the $3x million loan
element. The recipient may abstain from drawing the entire amount or a part of it if its
utilization is not justified by the anticipated combination of private and social benefits
(or rates of return). This option also minimizes the recipient’s future debt burden. For
the multilateral development banks (and, to some extent, national aid agencies), the
arrangement would also allay their fears that continued political will for sustaining or
increasing future volumes of resource transfers might not be forthcoming. In the
illustration, it is only the $x million grant which would not generate future reflows—the
$3x million will, even at non-concessional higher interest rate and/or shorter grace
period which would provide the needed replenishments.
8 Summary and conclusion
The issue of whether official assistance should be given in the form of loans or grants
has recently started to attract policy attention, particularly after Meltzer’s Report (IFIAC
2000). But there have been no attempts at an academic level to examine the various
issues entailed by a shift in the grant-loan policy mix and the associated issue of soft
versus non-concessional loans. The present study constitutes an exploratory attempt to
fill this vacuum. The pioneering nature also prompted us to examine broad and
panoramic problems related to the issue.
Specifically, we empirically examined, among others, factors that have historically
affected the mix between loans and grants at the bilateral level. We observed that donor
countries’ high economic growth and an upturn in their economic cycles tend to raise
the mix in favour of grants, while the donors’ high per capita income level and ratio of
donor government spending to GDP has the opposite effect. The trend increase in the
ratio of grants to total aid in the past decades is also observed to have levelled off in the
1990s, after controlling for the effects of a number of other factors. It was also observed
that the preference for grants was characteristic of right-wing donor governments.
Finally, although the extent of checks and balances and political constraints on the
executive arm of government seems to reduce the fraction of aid given in the form of
grants, the evidence is weak, if not fragile.
We also examined on the basis of past bilateral aid allocations the implication of a
switch from loans to grants. Our empirical tests suggest that the immediate effect is a
reduction in the volume of aid—presumably and understandably, because the grant-
equivalent of a dollar loan is less than 1. But there is no evidence that current resource
transfers are influenced by reflows currently generated from past loans and, hence, by
reflows currently being forgone because past transfers have been in grant form. To the
extent that the experience of the bilateral aid agencies can be extrapolated and extended
to multilateral donors, one can also infer that a switch today from loans to grants is
unlikely to affect the volume of their disbursable resources in the future. But this
inference is vulnerable to the fallacy of composition concept and should therefore be
treated with caution.
We also analysed the implications to recipient governments of changes in the grant-loan
mix, as well as the degree of concessionality on the loans. First, the effect on recipient29
government efficiency was examined by empirically testing for the relative effects of
grants versus loans on other budget components. According to one of our observations,
grants—more than loans—promote government consumption spending and retard
investment spending. Also, while the evidence of the effect on tax effort is mixed for
relatively high-income recipients, a high preponderance of grants in total aid is found to
reduce tax effort in relatively low-income countries. In addition, while it has practically
no effect on domestic sources of deficit financing in low-income countries, there is
some evidence (albeit weak) that a high ratio of grants in total aid volume increases
deficit financing by the relatively high-income recipient governments. On the whole, the
evidence suggests that grants are less efficiently utilized by recipient governments than
loans, if the efficiency indicators are to imply—as is being done in fiscal reform
literature—high government investment spending in relation to consumption spending,
higher tax effort and reduced domestic financing of fiscal deficits.
In addition, we examined whether and how the extent of loan concessionality affects the
volume of official borrowing by the recipients. There is robust evidence from our
empirical test that a high degree of concessionality on official loans is an incentive for
recipient governments to borrow more and they respond both to subsidized interest rates
and long grace periods.
The study also examined factors which have influenced donors’ decisions in the past
regarding the mix between grants and loans, as well as the degree of loan
concessionality (and how this was being effected between subsidized interest rate and
longer grace period). Not many systematic factors are observed to have an influence on
the grant-loan mix given to recipients. But a high degree of concessionality—both in the
form of reduced interest rates and longer grace periods—is found to be awarded to
recipients with low per capita income and high economic growth.
Based on these findings, we also discussed the circumstances under which grants, soft
loans and non-concessional loans should have a comparative advantage, depending on
the objectives donors want to achieve. We remarked that criteria similar to those being
discussed in the paper do not appear to have been applied often by donors in the past in
the allocation of resource transfers between grants, soft loans and non-concessional
loans.
Finally, we concluded the paper by suggesting the necessity for, and modality of,
separating concessional loans into two constituent parts: pure grants and non-
concessional loans. This would entail the recipient being given the grant component,
coupled with the option to take as much as it wishes from the non-concessional loan
component. We discussed how this would overcome many of the adverse incentives and
related problems of concessional loans.
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